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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the estate planner is prepared to litigate with the Commissioner and
risk the loss of his client's marital deduction, a form of bequest
should be employed which is acceptable under section 4.01 of Rev.
Proc. 64-19. If the estate planner still prefers to use the pecuniary
interest formula, it should be amended to comply with section 2.02
of Rev. Proc. 64-19 by adding: (1) a clause requiring the executor,
when satisfying the bequest, to distribute assets, including cash,
having an aggregate fair market value at the date, or dates, of distri-
bution amounting to no less than the amount of that bequest, as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, or (2) a clause
requiring the executor to distribute assets, including cash, fairly
representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all
property thus available for distribution in satisfaction of the marital
bequest. Consideration should also be given to the use of a frac-
tional share formula which complies with the provisions of section
4.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19. This formula has not received the at-
tention shown the pecuniary interest formula because of the com-
plexity of its administration. It was thought to require a fraction
of each asset to be distributed to each beneficiary.-"
It is suggested that whichever path is employed to escape its
thrust, Rev. Proc. 64-19 may achieve a beneficial result by inspiring
reviews of wills and testamentary plans, reviews which are often
long overdue.
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-Hospital's Liability-Standard of Care
In Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hosp., ac-
tion was brought by a patient to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly caused by the hospital's negligence. The court
held that, even though there was no deviation from the local
standard of care, the hospital was negligent for failing to adhere
to its own regulations which required that it provide qualified
physicians. The questions presented by the decision are whether
a court should allow hospital rules in as evidence of a higher stan-
dard of care and, if it does, would such rules impose an undue
burden on a layman administrator in requiring him to ensure that
" CASNER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 798.
1 200 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964).
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a physician is competent. Since the trend is to reject charitable im-
munity, it will be assumed for the purpose of this note that all
hospitals are liable in tort.
2
The liability of a hospital may be predicated upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior which holds the principal liable for the
tortious act of his servant if such act was committed while further-
ing a purpose of the principal.' Under this agency theory, the hos-
pital has been held responsible for the negligence of an elevator
operator,4 a nurse, an intern,' and a physician.7 In determining
whether a doctor or nurse is the servant of the hospital, most courts
apply the test of whether they are subject to the hospital's control
or right of control in regard to the work to be done and the manner
of performing it.' However, a physician or a nurse employed by the
hospital may become the temporary servants of a self-employed
2 At one time most jurdisdictions held that a charitable hospital was
immune from liability for the tortious acts of its employees. Illinois, the
jurisdiction deciding Darling, has repudiated the immunity doctrine. See
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950). Other jurisdictions
still hold that a non-profit hospital is exempt from liability, but even these
courts will vary as to whether such exemption is complete or partial.
Nevertheless, the trend is to reject complete immunity from liability.
See President & Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); PROSSER, TORTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964); Note, 37 N.C.L.
REv. 209 (1959); Note, 30 N.C.L. Rnv. 67 (1951).
'Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952). See generally
Southwick, Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 153 (1960).
'Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 173 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
'Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 216 Ala. 326, 113 So. 79
(1927) (failure of nurse to call doctor in time to deliver child); Goff v.
Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958) (failure to
call doctor when aware bleeding above normal); Pensacola Sanitarium v.
Wilkins, 68 Fla. 447, 67 So. 124 (1914) (burning the patient by leaving
hot water bottle in bed). In Byrd v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 202 N.C. 337,
162 S.E. 738 (1932), the court stated that a nurse has the affirmative duty
to exercise reasonable care, skill and judgment in the treatment of the
patient's case. This is generally the standard of conduct required of a
nurse.
'Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d 997 (1953); City of
Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942); Waynick v. Reardon.
236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Curry, 173
Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939).
'Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d
249 (1929); Brant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166, 8 P.2d 972 (1932).
See generally Southwick, supra note 3, at 153.
'St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 4
N.W.2d 637 (1942); Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820
(1929); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Rust, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 120 S.W. 249 (1909).
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doctor who then becomes responsible for their negligence.9 On the
other hand, some courts hold that respondeat superior is inap-
plicable between the hospital and the physician employee. The
rationale used in these cases is that a hospital can not control the
professional activities of a doctor because the hospital is not com-
petent to practice medicine.' ° When the physician is not a servant
but is an independent contractor, it is generally agreed that the
hospital is not liable for his malpractice under respondeat superior."
There is a concept of hospital liability that does not require
negligence of an employee or servant before the hospital will be
answerable in tort for injuries suffered by a patient. This legal
obligation to compensate arises from the negligence of the hospital
itself. Findings of corporate negligence have usually been limited
to administrative acts and omissions, such as not providing a nurse,"2
not furnishing proper and safe equipment,'" not exercising due care
in the selection and retention of a physician,'14 and not having avail-
able another physician when the patient's doctor is absent.' 5 The
court in Darling applied this concept of corporate liability to a situa-
tion in which the hospital was negligent for failing to ensure that
only qualified doctors were permitted to use its facilities.'
6
*E.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959). See
generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 872, 912 (1962).
"°Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Iterman v.
Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
"1E.g., Bums v. Eno, 213 Iowa 881, 240 N.W. 209 (1932). In Smith
v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941), the court held that
a hospital, unless it was negligent in selecting a doctor for a patient, would
not be liable for the negligence of a doctor who was neither an employee
nor a servant of the hospital for the purpose of treating patients, but who
was a member of its staff.
12 Guilliams v. Hollywood Hosp., 18 Cal. 2d 97, 114 P.2d 1 (1941).
Baker v. Leland Stanford Univ., 133 Cal. App. 243, 23 P.2d 1071
(1933); Medical & Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cauthorn, 229 S.E.2d 932
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
" Edwards v. Grace Hosp. Soc'y, 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944);
Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953);
Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941); Hoke v. Glenn,
167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914).
1 In Yeates v. Harms, 393 N.W.2d 982 (Kan. 1964), a physician testi-
fied that a doctor would be negligent if he absenced himself from a case
without making arrangements for another doctor to look after his patient.
This same expert also testified that a hospital would be negligent if it
failed to have available another doctor when a patient's physician was absent.
" The plaintiff in Dayan v. Wood River Township Hosp., 18 Ill. App. 2d
263, 152 N.E.2d 205 (1958), was denied reappointment to the hospital staff
on the grounds that he had failed to keep abreast of current medical pro-
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In order to hold a hospital liable, it is necessary for a jury to
decide whether there has been a deviation from that degree of care,
skill, and diligence used by hospitals in that community. It is the
general rule that the standard of care for a hospital and a doctor
is established by the medical profession in the local area. The reason
for this reliance on the local standard, especially in the case of a
doctor, is the lack of a jury's medical knowledge and ability to
decide whether or not due care was exercised.' There are decisions,
however, that have held that the local standards concerning a hos-
pital are not always conclusive of due care when relied upon by the
hospital as a defense.'" This exception to the local standard rule has
generally been applied only to non-medical services that are usually
rendered by all hospitals regardless of locality. In these cases, the
fact that the administration merely utilized the means at hand in
the community will not exonerate the hospital from liability.'"
Besides being held to a local standard of care, a hospital may also
cedures and that he failed to call early consultation in difficult cases. In up-
holding the right of the hospital to deny the plaintiff the right to use its
facilities, the court stated:
A hospital is not an annex to every doctor's office where the same freedom
of practice as exists in the office continues. Nurses and other employees
of the hospital are under the direction and control of doctors from time
to time, and costly equipment and facilities are made available for their
use. Liability might well be made to fall upon the hospital if their person-
nel or equipment were permitted to be subject to the control of one lacking
in some of the necessary professional skills.
Id. at 270, 152 N.E.2d at 208. The New York court in Hendrickson v.
Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899 (1937), held the hospital liable on the
theory of corporate negligence for allowing an incompetent person to use
its facilities.
1" See MeCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 549, 605-09 (1959).
18 South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 233 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250
(1936) ; Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d
36 (1956); Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Ass'n, 213 Mo. App. 363, 249 S.W.
666 (1923); Liebrecht v. Gotham Sanitarium, 284 App. Div. 781, 134
N.Y.S.2d 762 (1954).
"p In Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940), the court
applied the same rationale to a physician. It was stated in the opinion that
today, with the rapid methods of transportation and easy means of com-
munication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor
is not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular
village where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned,
the borders of the . . . community have in effect, been extended so as
to include those centers readily accessible where treatment may be had
which the local physician.., is unable to give.
Id. at 349, 294 N.W. at 18.
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have to conform to a statutory standard of reasonable care.2" Most
courts have regarded a violation of a statute as negligence per se
or as a presumption of negligence. 2 ' The better view, but a minority
one, is that a statutory violation is only evidence of negligence.22
When the standard is not imposed by the state but is adopted by the
hospital itself, some courts have held that the private rule is ad-
missible as evidence of the hospital's standard of care.23 These same
decisions, however, have said that a private rule would probably not
be admitted as evidence unless all the hospitals in the community
have adopted the same regulation. The court in Darling did not
specifically say that all hospitals in the local area had to accept and
approve a private rule before it could be used as evidence. Thus,
the principal case indicates that a hospital may be held to a standard
of care higher than the local standard.
Should such a rule be admissible in evidence on behalf of a
plaintiff? A hospital should be allowed to prescribe rules con-
trolling those permitted to use its facilities. If the court allows
these rules to be introduced as evidence, it would seem that the more
cautious a hospital is by adopting regulations for the safety of its
patients, the more likely it will be held negligent in situations where
other hospitals not having similar regulations would probably not
be held negligent. Giving the private rule the effect of evidence
of the standard could tend to discourage a hospital from adopting
any rule.2 4 A fallacy in the argument against admission is the as-
" In addition to the private rules of the hospital, the plaintiff in Darling
was permitted to offer in evidence the rules and regulations of the Illinois
Dept. of Public Health promulgated under the Hospital Licensing Act of
1953, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11132, §§ 142-157 (1954).
2 Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 193 At. 877 (1937); Reynolds v.
Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954).
22 Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co., 197 Ark. 425, 122 S.W.2d 597
(1938) ; Simpson v. Wood, 260 N.C. 157, 132 S.E.2d 369 (1963).
2 Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Judd v.
Park Ave. Hosp., 37 Misc. 2d 614, 235 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct.), ajfd,
235 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1962); Corwin v. Univ. of Rochester, 147 N.Y.S.2d 571
(Sup. Ct. 1955). In Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963),
the court held that an adopted rule promulgated by the American Psychiatric
Association could be introduced as evidence of the standard of care a
psychiatrist should adhere to. This case was cited in Wilson v. Lowe's
Asheboro Hardware, 259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963), which held that
an advisory safety code voluntarily adopted by the defendant was admissible
to establish negligence. For discussion of these two unprecedented cases, see
Torts, 11th Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv.
721, 727-28, 736-37 (1964).", Although a hospital was not involved in Tonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71
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sumption that any violation of a rule will automatically result in
liability. Actually, such rules would not be an absolute standard,
but would only be evidence to be considered by the jury. Thus, a
hospital would be free to introduce evidence to show that a viola-
tion of its rules was not negligence. If the rule calls for more than
is reasonable under the circumstances, it should be excluded by
the court. Therefore, since no absolute standard is imposed by a
hospital rule, the result reached in the Darling decision should be
followed by the courts.
But, since the administrator was a layman, did the court in
Darling impose an unreasonable responsibility upon him to see that
only competent physicians were allowed to use the hospital facilities?
It is this writer's opinion that under the facts of the case no un-
reasonable obligation was placed upon the administrator. Not being
a doctor, the administrator would be held to the standard of what
a reasonable man would have done under the circumstances, not to
what a doctor would have done. The plaintiff's evidence clearly
showed that the administrator had not exercised reasonable care
to ensure that the hospital's doctors were qualified. He requested
neither the medical staff nor the governing board to examine the
competency of the physician who treated the plaintiff. Under the
facts presented, the court rightly held that the administrator had
failed to exercise reasonable care in supervising the conduct of the
hospital and the competency of its personnel.2"
The principal case is a departure from the idea that all hos-
pitals in the community must adopt the same rules before a hospital
regulation will be admissible in evidence. It is submitted that the
result of the Darling case should be followed, since by the admission
of the hospital rules, the jury would not be bound to decide negligence
Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898), the reason advanced by the court for not
admitting the defendant's rules in evidence was that a person should not be
penalized by the admission of self-adopted rules requiring greater care than
the law requires.
2 Most hospitals in this country have been approved by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals and have agreed to follow the rules
promulgated by the Joint Commission. If the particular jurisdiction will
allow the defendant's rules to be admitted in evidence, the establishing of the
administrator's obligation to see that consultants are called may be made
easier in that the accreditation standard may specifically place the responsi-
bility upon the administrator to ensure that consultations are called. Several
standards are presented and their possible effect on the hospital are discussed
in Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a Medical
Malpractice Suit, 12 VAND. L. Rzv. 649, 652-57 (1959).
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solely on the basis of the local standard but would have a choice as to
whether the local standard or the hospital rules were reasonable
under the circumstances.
WILLIAM GLENN BOYD
